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Abstract
Previous empirical work has shown that real natural gas prices have a negligible impact on total
U.S. industrial production and most of its sub-indices. We reassess these conclusions using a
multivariate framework and a time-frame that includes recent developments in the U.S. natural
gas market. Our results show that natural gas does affect U.S. economic activity, primarily
through changes in its production. The shale gas revolution has changed this relationship - a
one percentage point increase in natural gas supply raises total U.S. industrial production by
more after 2008 than before.
JEL Classification: E37, F47, Q43.
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1 Introduction
Relative to crude oil, comparatively little is known about the impact of the natural gas market
on U.S. economic performance. This has become an important issue given recent dynamics in
natural gas prices and production. Optimists continually tout the realized and potential economic
benefits of the “shale-gas revolution”, while many others remain unconvinced about its importance
or magnitude. Implicit in either view is an assumption about the past and future macroeconomic
impacts of the U.S. natural gas market, but empirical work on which to base this assumption is
relatively sparse.
In this paper we evaluate the importance of the natural gas industry on U.S. macroeconomic
performance. Our primary goal is to provide an empirical basis on which to judge the possible
∗The analysis and conclusions expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the U.S. Energy
Information Administration.
†We have benefitted from the comments and suggestions of Alan Beamon, Stephen Brown, John Conti, David
Daniels, Fred Joutz, Thomas Lee, Stephanie Lundquist-Arora, James Preciado, Elizabeth Sendich, Kay Smith, and
Russell Tarver.
1
impacts of recent developments. We further highlight the channels through which the natural gas
market interacts with the U.S. economy, illustrate how this relationship may be changing over time,
and consider possible explanations.
While there are many studies that use macroeconomic models to evaluate the economic impor-
tance of natural gas, recent empirical work on the macroeconomic impacts of the U.S. natural gas
market is limited.1 On the empirical side, Kliesen (2006) finds that natural gas prices have histor-
ically been unable to predict total U.S. industrial production. This paper uses a single-equation
framework and was completed before the large increases in natural gas production due to shale
gas.2 Costello et al. (2006) analyze the interaction between industrial natural gas prices, natural
gas consumption, and industrial sector activity and conclude that industrial sector firms respond
to relative energy prices, including natural gas prices. However, this paper does not focus on the
aggregate impacts of the natural gas market. Similarly, Apergis and Payne (2010) and Sari et al.
(2008) find a long-run relationship between natural gas consumption and economic growth in the
U.S., but do not consider how the natural gas market can influence economic activity. On the other
hand, Weber (2012) considers the economic impacts of the natural gas market after the shale gas
boom, but on a regional level.3
The lack of recent empirical work on the relationship between the natural gas market and the
U.S. economy is surprising given that natural gas accounts for nearly 25 percent of U.S. energy
consumption, making it the second-largest source of energy behind petroleum.4 Furthermore,
consumer expenditures on natural gas have averaged about one percent of personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) since 1987, and natural gas is used proportionately between the industrial,
commercial and residential, and electric power sectors.5
Given these broad uses for natural gas, there are various ways in which the natural gas market
can impact U.S. economic activity. Generally, they can be summarized as working initially through
either the supply or demand sides of the economy. The most straightforward supply impact is that
changes in the production of natural gas vary output in the oil and gas extraction sector, as well
as associated industries. This direct change in production and its ripple through the oil and gas
supply chain have been highlighted in many of the recent model-based studies on the economic
1Examples of studies focused on the impacts of shale gas include ACC (2011), ACC (2012), CitiGPS (2012), ICF
(2012), IHS (2011), IHS (2012), PWC (2011), PWC (2012b), PWC (2012a), PWC (2013), and Kinnaman (2010) and
citations therein.
2There is, however, a substantial amount of empirical research that explores the macroeconomic impacts of the
oil market, particularly in the U.S. [see for example Hamilton (2008) and references therein]. Kilian (2009) uses a
similar method to ours in quantifying the importance of different supply and demand shocks in the oil market.
3In research before deregulation of the U.S. natural gas market, Leone (1982) claims the impact of natural gas
price increases on the northeast regional economy are at least offset by gains due to greater revenue for natural gas
producers.
4Statistics on U.S. energy consumption are from the 2011 Annual Energy Review (AER) of the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA). See Appendix 1 for more information.
5Statistics on consumer expenditures on energy are from the national accounts of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). See Appendix 1 for more information.
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effects of shale gas (see references in footnote 1 above).
Natural gas also influences economic activity on the supply-side of the economy through the
investment of firms. The application of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling has made a
very large resource base available. This potential supply has led to substantial investment in the oil
and gas extraction and mining support sectors, as well as other related industries. The expectation
that this resource base can support lower natural gas prices for a sustained period is also leading
to investment by firms outside of the oil and gas industry which rely on natural gas as an input.
Lower natural gas prices, irrespective of their cause, lower input costs for firms. These can
be passed on to consumers by allowing firms to supply the same amount of goods and services at
lower prices. Firms may also realize higher profits, which can lead to additional hiring, capital
investment, higher dividends, or saving. Each has a follow-on impact on the economy-wide demand
for goods and services. Lower prices also directly influence demand through consumers. They can
raise disposable income, lower precautionary savings (or raise it in the case of a price rise), or cause
consumers to change their plans for the purchases of durable goods (Kilian, 2008). Each of these
result in alterations to the economy-wide demand for other goods and services stemming from the
initial variation in the price of natural gas.
With these various channels in mind, we estimate a structural vector autoregression (VAR) to
assess the impact of the natural gas market on U.S. economic activity. Our monthly four-variable
model characterizes the supply, demand, and price of U.S. natural gas. The results are presented
through impulse response analysis and variance decompositions of the model’s forecast error. We
also conduct sensitivity analysis on our results, including consideration of how recent developments
in the U.S. natural gas market may be affecting the VAR.
The VAR model and related sensitivity analysis lead to two primary conclusions. The first is
that natural gas supply changes are the primary means through which the U.S. natural gas market
impacts domestic economic activity. Variations in natural gas demand for heating and power or
other factors, while important for the natural gas price, do not impact economic activity in a
substantial way. Our second conclusion is that the shale gas revolution has in fact changed the
relationship between natural gas supply and U.S. economic activity. The responses of industrial
production to the same increase in natural gas supply are larger after 2008 than before, although
the size of this change remains unclear at this point.
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2 VAR Model
A general VAR process can be encapsulated by a mean-zero moving average representation, without
any deterministic terms (Lutkepohl, 2007):
yt =
∞∑
j=0
Bjut−j (1)
where yt is an N ×1 vector of variables, the Bj are N ×N matrices of coefficients, and the reduced
form errors (ut) are N ×1 white noise processes with E(ut,u′t) = Su. The coefficient matrices (Bj)
summarize the responses of the variables to the respective errors. Because Su is not necessarily
diagonal, the errors may be correlated across equations in the same time period. As is well-known,
this can make interpretation of any responses misleading, because co-movement with other variables
is not taken into account.
An equivalent representation of the moving average process with orthogonal innovations can
circumvent this issue. In this case the transformed innovations will be uncorrelated by construction,
so that the variance-covariance matrix of the shocks is diagonal. The identity matrix is often chosen
in this case, which amounts to finding an N ×N matrix G such that:
GSuG
′
= I (2)
where I is the N×N identity matrix. The orthogonal innovations are t = Gut, so that E(t, ′t) =
GE(ut,u
′
t)G
′
= I. These innovations are uncorrelated across both time and equations. In this
case equation (1) can be rewritten:
yt =
∞∑
j=0
BjGt−j (3)
In this equation the BjG summarize the impulse responses which are plotted below. Also used in
subsequent analysis to summarize model results are forecast error variance decompositions.
The forecast error variance decomposition can be reconstructed by recognizing that∑∞
j=i BjGt+i−j = Etyt+i, so that the error of the i-step ahead forecast is (Enders, 2010):
yt+i − Etyt+i =
i−1∑
j=0
BjGt+i−j (4)
From this equation we can extract the total variance in the i-step ahead forecast error of variable
j, as well as the variance in the error of variable j due to variable k. The variance decompositions
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are reported as the fraction of the error variance in j due to k, so that the sum over all k is one.
2.1 Estimation, Data, and Identification
Our model is estimated on the annual log difference of series which range from 1993M11-2012M12
and encompass the supply, demand, and price of U.S. natural gas.6 We use an annual difference to
remove both the seasonality and trend in each variable. Unless otherwise specified, each estimation
uses a lag of four months, which is chosen based on the Akaike information criterion.
Our supply variable is the change in marketed U.S. natural gas production (∆ngs). We use
marketed instead of gross production to exclude any gas which is used in extraction or in processing
operations. And we do not differentiate between “wet” and “dry” natural gas because our interest
is in the economics of production, irrespective of the type of gas supplied.
We separate the demand for natural gas between two variables. The first, total U.S. industrial
production (∆ipd), encompasses demand for use in the production of goods and services. This
is the type of demand associated with U.S. economic activity, such as feedstock demand from a
chemical firm. The second demand variable, residential natural gas demand (∆end), represents
natural gas energy demand. Changes in this variable reflect variations in the demand for natural
gas for heating and power purposes (possibly due to changes in the weather).
We prefer residential natural gas demand as a proxy for energy demand to the alternatives
because it does not reflect changes due to economic activity. Other possible variables such as the
sum of non-industrial natural gas demand do reflect changes in economic activity. For example,
commercial demand for natural gas may rise because of colder weather, but it may also be higher
because of overtime that requires additional power. Using only residential natural gas demand
avoids this problem.
The final variable in the model is the real Henry Hub price of natural gas (∆rpg). The Henry
Hub price is used because it is a marker for other natural gas prices, and changes in its value are
more likely to be reflected in the prices paid by both consumers and firms than other available
natural gas prices. Given these variables and consistent with the notation above, we decompose
the errors and identify the shocks in the model as:
ut ≡

u∆ngst
u∆ipdt
u∆endt
u∆rpgt
 =

g11 0 0 0
g21 g22 0 0
g31 g32 g33 0
g41 g42 g43 g44


“Supply” shock
“Economic Activity” shock
“Energy Demand” shock
“Other” shock
 (5)
For clarity we use quotations around the description of each shock. The first shock, a “Supply”
6See Appendix 1 for full details on the data.
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shock, is an unexpected change in U.S. marketed natural gas supply. One concern with interpreting
this as a “Supply” shock is that the supply of natural gas from storage is omitted. Unexpected
changes in the supply of natural gas from storage are reflected in the “Other” shock. An example
is the supply disruption in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. We assume that such unexpected
changes can impact the remaining variables during the current month. This ordering also implies
that ∆ngs does not respond to any of the other shocks in the current month, which reflects the
costs and difficulties of changing natural gas production quickly.
The second shock, an “Economic Activity” shock, is an unexpected change in the demand
for natural gas due to changes in economic activity. The sudden drop in industrial production
associated with the recent U.S. financial crisis is an example. This shock can impact ∆end and ∆rpg
in the current month. Economic activity can alter energy demand as firms alter their production
plans, and natural gas prices are sensitive to expectations about future demand as well.
The third shock, an “Energy Demand” shock, is an unexpected movement in the demand for
natural gas as an energy source. Such events can occur when weather is colder than expected,
leading to greater demand for heating. This shock impacts only ∆rpg in the current period. The
final shock, an “Other” shock, represents the impact of other demand or non-demand factors on
the real natural gas price. This includes the demand and supply of natural gas for storage, whether
for speculative or precautionary purposes. It also includes the impact of movements in the oil price
on natural gas prices.7 These “Other” shocks cannot change either natural gas supply or demand
in the current month.
3 Results
In this section we use our VAR model to understand and quantify the impact of natural gas on
U.S. economic activity. We begin with the impulse responses of both the real Henry Hub price
and industrial production to each of the shocks. Initially these are the responses to a one standard
deviation increase in each shock, which are shown over 12 months (solid black line) along with
the associated standard error bands (+/- two standard errors, dashed red lines). A one standard
deviation increase is used when considering the impact of different shocks on either variable because
units differ between shocks, so that raising the shocks by some percentage point leads to increases
of different magnitudes. For example, an unexpected one percentage point increase in industrial
production is a much larger rise than a one percentage point increase in the real Henry Hub price.
Using one standard deviation helps to normalize the shocks when considering their impact on a
particular variable. Percentage point increases are used when comparing the impact of one shock
across different variables.
7There is evidence that these two variables have a time-varying relationship, and when they do move together the
natural gas price tends to follow the oil price (Ramberg and Parsons, 2012).
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The responses are also cumulative over the 12 months so that we are able to interpret them
as the percent change in the underlying level of each variable, even though the estimated VAR is
in annual log differences. We then focus on the “Supply” shocks, and show the responses of both
industrial production and the real Henry Hub price to a one percentage point increase in natural
gas supply.
This is followed by a discussion of the variance decompositions of industrial production and
the real Henry Hub price. We then conduct sensitivity analysis on industrial production impulse
responses by varying the lag length and estimating the model in levels. The next sub-section uses
rolling regressions and estimations with dummy variables to consider how recent developments in
U.S. natural gas markets may be affecting the VAR. The section concludes with a discussion on
the plausibility of these changes.
3.1 Impulse Responses
Figure 1 shows the responses of the real Henry Hub price to unexpected increases in each of the
model’s four shocks. The results generally move in the direction that one would expect.
Figure 1
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The top-left panel of Figure 1 shows that a rise in natural gas supply leads to a steady decrease
in the real Henry Hub price over the following year. In terms of demand, the bottom-left panel of
Figure 1 shows that higher demand for energy leads to an increase in the natural gas price, but
the response of the price to higher economic activity is indistinguishable from zero. This may be
because only a small fraction of firms use natural gas as a feedstock, or in the direct production of
goods and services. But both consumers and firms use natural gas for heating and power, making
changes in such demand more important for the price. An “Other” shock also leads to a higher
Henry Hub price, and this may be interpreted as changes in inventories or variations in the price
of oil.
Figure 2 shows the responses of industrial production to unexpected increases in each of the
model’s four shocks as well. These results highlight the importance of natural gas supply for U.S.
economic activity.
Figure 2
The top-left panel of Figure 2 shows that unexpected increases in natural gas supply lead to
slightly higher industrial production. This one-to-two month increase is the result of a combination
of factors. There is the direct benefit to economic activity from greater natural gas production.
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This can be thought of as higher output in oil and gas extraction and mining support, as well as
related activities.
As shown in the top-left panel of Figure 1, the same “Supply” shock leads to a lower natural
gas price. These lower prices for consumers and firms can translate to higher disposable income,
either because expenditures on natural gas fall or because goods prices are lower, and therefore
increase profits for firms. Although it is unclear if these lower prices can be passed on to consumers
within the one-to-two months reflected in the responses. There also has been a recent association
of greater natural gas supply with investment in oil and gas extraction and mining support, which
also raises economic activity.
The increase in industrial production due to its own shock is as expected. The bottom row of
Figure 2 shows that the industrial production response to “Energy Demand” or “Other” shocks is
small, and statistically insignificant from zero. It appears the price rises associated with either of
these shocks do not translate through to reductions in industrial production. The impulse responses
indicate that changes in natural gas supply are the most important factors in the natural gas market
for changing industrial production.
Figure 3 illustrates this response more intuitively by showing a one percentage point increase
in supply and its effect on industrial production and the real natural gas price.
Figure 3
The shapes of each response are the same as shown in the top-left panels of Figures 1 and
2. However, the magnitude of each response is clearer in Figure 3, as is the interpretation. The
average annual increase in U.S. natural gas supply has been roughly five percentage points since
2007, which corresponds to an increase of around 0.5 percentage points in industrial production
and a decrease of about five percentage points in the real Henry Hub price using the results of the
impulse responses.
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3.2 Variance Decompositions
Another way to assess the impact of each shock on the variables in the model is by calculating the
variance of the model’s forecast error and then specifying the share of that variance due to each
shock at different time horizons (variance decomposition). This is shown for the real Henry Hub
price and industrial production at 1, 4, and 12 month intervals in Table 1.
Real Henry Hub Price 1M 4M 12M
“Supply” Shock 3.2 10.6 15.9
“Economic Activity” Shock - - -
“Energy Demand” Shock 19.9 29.2 31.9
“Other” Shock 76.5 59.4 43.8
Industrial Production 1M 4M 12M
“Supply” Shock 12.8 2.5 -
“Economic Activity” Shock 87.2 96.5 90.0
“Energy Demand” Shock 0.0 - -
“Other” Shock 0.0 - -
Table 1: Percent of horizon step ahead forecast error variance of selected variable accounted for by
the listed shocks. A dash means the fraction is not statistically different from zero.
For the real Henry Hub price, the “Energy Demand” and “Other” shocks are the most impor-
tant. The “Other” shock accounts for over 76 percent of the variance of the forecast error for the
real Henry Hub price at one month, and still over 43 percent at 12 months. The importance of the
“Energy Demand” shock for the variance of the forecast error of the price grows over time, as does
that of the “Supply” shock. The “Economic Activity” shock is not statistically different from zero
in accounting for the variance of the forecast error of the real Henry Hub price at any time horizon.
The variance of the forecast error of industrial production is accounted for primarily by the
“Supply” and “Economic Activity” shocks. The “Supply” shock, as with the impulse responses,
has a substantial impact and then quickly gets smaller. The importance of the “Economic Activity”
shock for the variance of the forecast error of industrial production remains dominant throughout
the 12 months. In general, the variance decompositions of the real Henry Hub price and industrial
production reinforce the results of each respective impulse response.
3.3 Sensitivity to Lag Length and Differencing
The results in the previous section are based on estimation of the VAR with a lag of four months and
using the annual log difference of each variable. Here we evaluate the sensitivity of the industrial
production responses by varying the lag length to 12 months and also by estimating the VAR in
levels.
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of industrial production (to a one standard deviation
shock) when the lag length is extended to 12 months (the results hold for an 18-month lag as well).
The results are similar to those in Figure 2. The “Supply” shock leads to a small increase that
is statistically significant and quickly becomes insignificant. And the response to an “Economic
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Figure 4
Activity” shock grows over the 12-month horizon. As before, the responses to “Energy Demand”
or “Other” shocks are indistinguishable from zero.
Figure 5 plots the responses of industrial production using the log of each variable (with a
13-month lag, based on Akaike information criterion). Here, the cumulative responses are not
necessary because we are using the levels of each variable in the estimation.
Again, the immediate response of industrial production to natural gas supply is small and
quickly becomes insignificant (although the shape is different). The responses in this case are
similar to the base estimation and the case with a 12-month lag. The unexpected increase in
economic activity causes industrial production to rise as well, although it flattens out in this case.
The responses to the remaining shocks are statistically insignificant as before.
3.4 Sensitivity to Recent Developments
The impulse responses and variance decompositions shown above assume there are no major
changes, or structural breaks, in the relationship between the natural gas market and U.S. eco-
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Figure 5
nomic activity throughout the sample period. This may not be true given recent developments in
the U.S. natural gas market, and we consider the possibility of breaks in this sub-section. However,
we do not formally test for a structural break. Our concern with tests for structural breaks is that
most require an assumption that 5-15 percent of the sample, at the end, does not contain a break
(Eklund et al., 2011). The recent nature of changes in the U.S. natural gas market makes this
assumption difficult to verify.
Instead, we use two commonly employed techniques over a variety of break dates with a focus
on the responses of industrial production. We begin by estimating the same VAR model as above
using rolling regressions over different sample periods to narrow down possible break dates. The use
of rolling regressions is commonly employed by forecasters in dealing with structural change (Stock
and Watson, 2008). We then estimate the VAR over the full sample period with dummy variables to
control for the possible break date. Our analysis considers only the industrial production responses
to “Supply” shocks. The results for the remaining three shocks are indistinguishable from the
responses outlined in the previous two sub-sections.8 Based on rolling regressions, Table 2 shows the
8The response to an “Economic Activity” shock has a similar shape and magnitude for each rolling regression.
Industrial production responses to “Energy Demand” or “Other” shocks are indistinguishable from zero in each
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variance decompositions of industrial production accounted for by “Supply” shocks over different
sample periods for the first three months.
Sample 1M 2M 3M
Through 2004 - - -
Through 2006 - - -
Through 2008 12.3 7.5 4.6
Through 2010 10.7 5.6 3.5
Through 2012 12.8 6.9 4.0
Table 2: Percent of horizon step ahead forecast error variance of industrial production accounted
for by the natural gas “Supply” shock over the listed sample period. A dash means the fraction is
not statistically different from zero.
Table 2 indicates that the “Supply” shock is unimportant for the variance of the forecast error of
industrial production until the sample extends through 2008. After this time period it can account
for over 10 percent of the variance of the forecast error at one month, and up to 4.6 percent after
one year. These results indicate a change in the responses at sometime between the end of 2006
and the end of 2008.
To consider this further, Figure 6 shows the responses of industrial production to natural gas
“Supply” shocks with the sample period ending in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2012. Only four months
are shown because each response is statistically indistinguishable from zero after this point.
There is a clear, albeit small, difference between the responses before 2008 and those after. That
is, according to the model the same one percentage point increase in natural gas supply leads to
initial responses of industrial production that are 0.05 percentage points higher if the sample ends
in 2008 rather than 2007. Our conclusion from the variance decompositions and impulse responses
based on rolling regressions is that there is likely a break in the data during 2008.
Given the results from the rolling regressions, Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of industrial
production to a “Supply” shock if dummy variables are added to the VAR beginning in 2008 to
control for a break.9 The solid line is the response before 2008 and the dashed line after 2008.
There is a much larger difference between the responses in this case, which indicates that the
rolling regressions may be underestimating the response of industrial production to a “Supply”
shock after 2008.
Using dummy variables leads to the same conclusion as with rolling regressions, that there is an
amplification in the response of industrial production to unexpected changes in natural gas supply
after 2008. Where the two methods diverge is in the magnitude of the amplification.
regression as well.
9Using F-tests we are able to reject the hypothesis that each corresponding coefficient is the same before and after
the break at the 99 percent confidence level.
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Figure 6
3.5 Are Magnified Responses Plausible?
Both the rolling regressions and dummy variable estimations indicate that the responses of indus-
trial production to natural gas “Supply” shocks are larger after 2008 than before. In this sub-section
we consider whether there is a reason that a natural gas “Supply” shock of the same size might lead
to bigger industrial production responses after 2008. To this end, we analyze data on the channels
through which natural gas affects U.S. economic activity. Our results are suggestive. We do not
present any formal statistical analysis, mainly because the events are very recent.
The most obvious reason that industrial production responses may be larger after 2008 is that
output in oil and gas extraction, mining support, and related industries is higher after this point in
time. Figure 8 plots real output in oil and gas extraction and mining support over the full sample
period. The vertical dashed line corresponds to 2008. Real output in these industries grows after
2008, although it is still below levels seen earlier in the sample period. This representation is also
an underestimate, as it does not include additional output generated along the oil and gas supply
chain. It is possible such increases help to magnify the impact of “Supply” shocks in the model,
but their importance is uncertain.
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Figure 7
Lower natural gas prices, whether due to higher supply or lower demand, might also change the
impact of natural gas supply on U.S. economic activity. Lower natural gas prices increase consumer
disposable income, which allows for purchases of additional goods and services. This income could
be higher because the direct heating and power costs paid by consumers are reduced due to falling
prices. Firms might also pass on lower input costs to consumers, in which case the level of goods
prices may fall. If firms do not pass on these energy savings, their profits rise, possibly leading to
expansion, investment, or larger payments to owners.
Figure 9 shows the share of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) on natural gas on the
left axis, and the annual percent change in the consumer price index (CPI) for commodities on the
right.10 The price level for commodities has been relatively steady before and after 2008, indicating
that changes in the general price level for goods are unlikely to account for the changes in our VAR.
The share of PCE due to natural gas falls to the lowest level in our sample after 2008. However,
this level is not unprecedented in the sample (1999 and 2002 are almost as low), and the share
10The PCE calculation is based on direct expenditures on natural gas, assuming a fifth of electricity expenditures
are due to natural gas. We use a fifth because this is the share of electric power generation accounted for by natural
gas.
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Figure 8
Figure 9
of PCE due to natural gas is below one percent in any case through most of the sample. The
possibility that lower natural gas prices change the response of industrial production after 2008
cannot be ruled out, but its importance is unclear.
A final factor that might amplify industrial production responses to increases in natural gas
supply after 2008 is the association of investment in recent years with higher levels of natural
gas supply. This is because the potential size of the resource base had led firms to increase their
investment in oil and gas extraction. Figure 10 shows real investment in oil and gas extraction and
mining support over the sample period.
There is no clear increase in such activity after 2008 as compared to the years directly before.
However, there is a clear increase beginning around 2005 and continuing through 2011. Additionally,
Figure 10 shows only investment in oil and gas extraction and mining support, not investment in
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Figure 10
other associated industries along the supply chain. Nor does it include the investment by other
firms, such as chemicals, which may be taking advantage of the expected lower natural gas prices
for their feedstocks. Thus the actual increases in investment are likely substantially higher. As
with output and prices, changes in investment might help to explain the increasing responses of
industrial production to supply shocks in the VAR.
Our conclusion in light of the data is that the increasing impacts of supply shocks after 2008
obtained using the VAR model are both plausible and likely. They could be driven by a combination
of greater natural gas production, lower natural gas prices, and higher investment. At this point,
however, we are unable to separate out the importance of each factor.
4 Conclusion
The VAR model and related sensitivity analysis lead to two primary conclusions. The first is
that natural gas supply is the primary means through which the U.S. natural gas market impacts
domestic economic activity. This is supported by the quantitative results of the model and is robust
to different sensitivity analysis. Our second conclusion is that the shale gas revolution has in fact
changed the relationship between natural gas supply and U.S. economic activity. We show that
the response of industrial production to the same size increase in natural gas supply is actually
larger after 2008 than before. A look at the relevant data indicates that such a change is possible,
although its magnitude is uncertain.
Both time and further research are required to know if the changes reflected in the model after
2008 are temporary or permanent. Arora (2013) uses a macroeconomic model to show that if
the amplification is led by investment then it will be temporary because of the declining marginal
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product of capital. He argues that the natural gas industry must somehow raise economy-wide
productivity to make these magnified responses more persistent. However, if the larger responses
are due primarily to the increase in supply itself or to lower prices, then these responses could be
permanent. This is true because it is plausible that production can continue at post-2008 levels
for the foreseeable future due to the large U.S. natural gas resource base, which might result in
persistently lower natural gas prices as well.
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Appendix 1: Data
The share of natural gas used as a fraction of total energy consumption is calculated based on the
2006 Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey from the EIA. The data is taken from Table 1.2 of
this survey, which is available at http://www.eia.gov/emeu/mecs/mecs2006/2006tables.html.
Data on the share of personal consumption expenditures spent on select energy goods comes from
19
the BEA. Specifically, the shares are derived from Table 2.5.5 of the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA), which are available at http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp at an
annual frequency. Also taken from the BEA are value added in the oil and gas extraction and mining
support sectors, each of which is taken from the GDP-by-Industry tables, real value added table.
The investment data on these same two sectors comes from the BEA’s fixed assets tables, 3.7E, and
the sum of the values is deflated by the GDP deflator with the base year specified as 2005. The GDP
deflator is available quarterly beginning in 1947 from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPDEF.
Data on natural gas production, the real natural gas price, and end-use consumption of natural
gas are taken from the EIA. Natural gas production is marketed U.S. natural gas withdrawals in
millions of cubic feet, and is available at a monthly frequency from 1980M01 at http://www.eia.
gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9010us2m.htm. The real natural gas price is the Henry Hub price deflated by
the U.S. producer price index (PPI) for fuels and related products and power (WP05). The Henry
Hub price is available at a monthly frequency from 1993M11 and comes from http://research.
stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GASPRICE/. The PPI is available monthly from 1926M01 and
is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)
at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PPIENG. End-use consumption of natural
gas is available from the EIA’s monthly energy review. Data on consumption of natural gas by
end-use sector is available in Table 4.1 of this document, and the monthly historical data can
be found at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/#naturalgas in billions of cubic
feet. In calculating the natural gas demand for use as energy, we use natural gas consumed in the
residential end-use sector.
The total U.S. industrial production index is taken from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, and is available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/download.htm at
a monthly frequency from 1967 onwards. The total index includes manufacturing, mining, and
utilities.
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